I. INTRODUCTION
Disabled people are legally protected against discrimination in both labor and housing markets. Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, states that any discrimination based on disability and other grounds shall be prohibited. However, several economic studies provide evidence that the disabled are discriminated against in the labor market (for a literature review, see Jones 2008) . Unfortunately, economics scholars have neglected to study disability discrimination in the housing market, and this issue deserves attention: a home is a primary necessity that determines social inclusion, job opportunities, and enjoyment of public services.
The first contribution of this study is that of filling this gap in the literature of the economics of discrimination. I propose a new application of a standard field experiment to investigate disability discrimination in the rental housing market and focus on people affected by blindness, who are numbered at more than 2.7 million in Europe alone (Pascolini and Mariotti 2012) . This study contributes to this literature in two additional ways: (1) it disentangles different aspects of disability discrimination that were previously unexplored, and (2) it shows the importance of analyzing behaviors of two types of advertisers: housing brokers and apartment owners. These contributions have strong direct relevance in terms of public policy.
Which field experiment should scholars use to analyze discrimination against blind tenants? In the United States, the Urban Institute (Turner et al. 2005 ) suggests using the inperson audit test (henceforth AT). Two actors, playing the role of tenants, are matched over all characteristics except for one (one actor is blind and the other is not) or two (one actor is blind and owns a guide dog; the other actor is neither blind nor owns a dog). The disabled actor visits several housing agencies and inquires about available housing units; if he owns an assistance dog, he also requests a waiver of restrictions on, and fees related to, the dog. The nondisabled actor who owns no dog visits the same housing agencies and inquires about housing units. In general, there is evidence of discrimination against disabled tenants when the percentage of housing units made available for the disabled actor is statistically significantly lower than that made available for the nondisabled counterpart.
However, ATs could provide biased results primarily because of matching problems. In fact, the experimenters may fail to match the actors over some characteristics that eventually affect the estimates of discrimination. In this study, I use an alternative field experiment
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Additional material is available at http://le. uwpress.org. that circumvents this problem: the so-called correspondence test (henceforth CT). 1 The CT is similar in the spirit to the AT; however, there is one crucial difference: the CT matches written messages instead of actors; thus, experimenters have complete control over the matching process.
As a second contribution, this study disentangles different aspects of disability discrimination. The disentanglement is possible because I compare three groups of household tenants: married tenants, which compose the control group (group A); married tenants where the wife is blind and owns a guide dog, which compose the treatment group 2 (group B); and married tenants where the wife is normal-sighted and owns a pet dog, which compose a second control group (group C). The comparison of these three groups allows me to investigate whether blind tenants assisted by a guide dog face discrimination because of their disability or because of the presence of the assistance dog, which is a specific type of illegal disability discrimination. This contribution has important policy implications, since different types of illegal disability discrimination need to be tackled in different manners.
The third contribution of this paper should also be relevant from the standpoint of policy makers. This study shows the importance of analyzing behaviors of two types of advertisers: housing brokers and apartment owners. 1 This methodology is also used to investigate other types of discrimination in the rental housing market, namely, discrimination based on ethnicity (for Sweden, Eriksson 2014 and Ahmed, Andersson, and Mats Hammarstedt 2010;  for Italy, Baldini and Federici 2011;  2 I have not used married tenants where the husband is blind because of the greater risk of these households being discriminated against based on their expected lower income. This risk is reduced by using a blind wife, since women's employment rates and wages are on average lower than men's in most OECD countries, Italy included. Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics.
They have different characteristics, so policy interventions that aim at affecting their behaviors will differ. Housing brokers are professional intermediary agents who advertise and rent out apartments that belong to someone else, 3 while apartment owners advertise and rent out their own apartments independently. Housing brokers are more likely than apartment owners to have complete knowledge of legislation; in Italy, they must either pass an exam or spend a long training period in a housing agency in order to obtain a brokerage license (Federazione Italiana Mediatori Agenti d'Affari 2006). They also conduct more frequent transactions, which increases their risk of being taken to court in case of misconduct and might decrease discriminatory behaviors. All things considered, housing brokers should discriminate less often than apartment owners.
I find statistically significant evidence that married tenants with a blind wife assisted by a guide dog are less frequently invited by apartment owners, compared to married tenants. Moreover, the results seem to suggest that this lower quantity of invitations is due to the presence of the guide dog alone, not to the disability status; this is the first CT to provide evidence for this type of discriminatory behavior. These results are robust to different specifications.
Discrimination based on the presence of a guide dog alone is a special case of illegal discriminatory treatment against disabled people, according to both Italian and E.U. law. 4 These legislations establish that this illegal behavior is to be labeled indirect discrimination against disabled people because it creates an indirect unfair effect on disabled people who need assistance dogs in daily activities; this concept is similar to that of the refusal to provide reasonable accommodation for disabled people in the United States. 5
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section summarizes the previous studies conducted with ATs and CTs on discrimination in the housing market against blind tenants.
Besides the Urban Institute, American fair housing organizations and other nonprofits also use ATs to investigate disability discrimination. 6 Results from a pilot AT conducted by the Urban Institute suggest that blind tenants could suffer from discrimination in the American housing market (Turner et al. 2005 Finally, there are two CTs on housing market discrimination against blind tenants that were conducted almost contemporaneously to 6 A list of these institutions is provided by Turner et al. (2005) . Names of additional institutions may be found on the website of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src = /program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/partners/FHIP. 7 The Americans with Disabilities Act, 1990, states that privately owned businesses, such as housing agencies, restaurants, and taxicabs, should allow people with disabilities to enter the business premises with their service animals. this experiment, yet developed completely independently. Heylen and Van den Broeck (2015) conducted a CT in 2013 in the Belgian rental housing market and find that blind tenants are 12.5% less likely to be invited to view the housing unit for which they applied, compared to normal-sighted tenants. A second CT on blind tenants was conducted in Belgium one year later, in 2014, by Verhaeghe, Van der Bracht, and Van de Putte (2016) ; they find that blind tenants are 35.6% less likely to be invited for a visit.
III. METHODS

Comparison of the AT and the CT
While this section provides an overview of strength and weaknesses of the AT and CT methodologies, full details are presented by Bertrand and Duflo (2016) , Rich (2014) , Pager (2007) , and Riach and Rich (2002) .
The AT is the method most frequently used to study discrimination against blind tenants in the housing market; however, it presents some weaknesses that can be overcome with the CT. Pager (2007) , Riach and Rich (2002) , Heckman (1998) , and Heckman and Siegelman (1993) explain that ATs could produce biased results for one main reason. Actor characteristics could be inaccurately matched because of what social scientists call unobservable characteristics; these characteristics are observed by the landlords but not by the researchers. Pager (2007) and Riach and Rich (2002) suggest that such characteristics might be reflected in subtle differences in the way applicant tenants interact with housing brokers; for instance, one actor could be perceived as being more friendly or could answer the landlord's questions more quickly. Furthermore, within studies on blind tenants with a guide dog, not all features of the dog might be accounted for by researchers and thus represent additional unobservable characteristics. 8 Taken together, these unobservable characteristics might convey systematically different information on the matched appli-cants, drive the differential treatment, and cause biased estimates of discrimination (Pager 2007) .
Moreover, Pager (2007) explains that one additional threat to the validity of the results from ATs is the so-called experimenter effect. Actors might be (sub)consciously motivated to (not) obtain evidence of discrimination and consequently adjust their behavior during their interactions with brokers.
Finally, Turner et al. (2005) argue that ATs conducted by fair housing organizations and other nonprofits are typically not designed to perform statistical inference, thus their results are not generalizable. This is a problem: so far, what is known about discrimination against tenants affected by blindness (and other disabilities) comes predominantly from these studies.
CTs have characteristics that address these weaknesses (Bertrand and Duflo 2016) and, therefore, are now considered to be the gold standard for studying discrimination (Baert 2015) . Most importantly, since CTs do not match actors, but instead written messages, they directly circumvent problems related to the presence of unobservable characteristics and to the experimenter effect (Bertrand and Duflo 2016; Pager 2007) .
Furthermore, CTs present additional desirable features. Written applications are currently delivered through the internet, which provides two advantages: (1) for the same budget, researchers can contact a larger number of agents compared to those they could contact with ATs, since no actor is involved (Bertrand and Duflo 2016) ; and (2) as I discuss in this paper, other types of agents can be targeted in addition to housing brokers, thus a more complete picture of discrimination in the housing market can be obtained.
On the downside, Pager (2007) argues that CTs measure discrimination only at the initial stage of the application process, while ATs allow the researcher to collect a measure of discrimination at each stage of the application process. Hence, the CT methodology should be considered as a tool that is complementary to the AT methodology, instead of its substitute.
Experiment Design
Given the background discussed in the previous subsection, I investigate discrimination against blind tenants with a CT. I conducted this field experiment in the Italian rental housing market from April 12 to June 22, 2013, sending 1,000 fictitious written applications in response to advertisements on the Italian classified website Subito.it. The usage of the internet to find housing is an increasingly popular solution in Italy, where six million people used the internet to find an apartment in 2013, according to a survey performed by Nielsen. 9 I used a random assignment procedure to send only one randomized application to each advertisement. This procedure is utilized in a number of published studies on discrimination based on other grounds (age and employment status, Carlsson and Eriksson 2014; ethnicity, Baldini and Federici 2011 Ahmed, Andersson, and Hammarstedt 2008) . There are four reasons for using this technique in lieu of the matched applications technique. First, since only one fictitious application per advertisement is sent, the risk of being detected by the advertisers is reduced. This risk is especially high for correspondence tests in the housing market because it is difficult to accurately keep track of advertisers' identities. As explain, advertisers may post multiple housing vacancies under different names. There could be many reasons for this behavior; in particular, apartment owners might not want to indirectly and publicly disclose their wealth on the internet. Furthermore, housing brokers may post multiple vacancies under the name of their real estate agency. Therefore, advertisers could be accidentally contacted multiple times with similar applications, could realize they are being deceived, and respond by altering their behavior. Second, similarly to the previous point, schol-ars' declinations to visit an apartment may increase the risk of detection. When an advertiser receives similar messages to decline the invitation to the same housing unit, she might reread the correspondents' application messages and alter her behavior for future similar applications. Third, one application per housing unit minimizes advertisers' inconvenience. The importance of these first three advantages increases with the number of groups of tenants being compared. 10 Fourth, the random assignment procedure is simpler to implement and cheaper than the matched applications technique. This point is important in light of researchers' time and budget constraints.
In addition to the randomized assignment, detection is avoided through the combination of two other features of my experiment. First, I solve the so-called disclosure problem (Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008): the target characteristic (in this study, blindness) must be clearly disclosed, in a written message, in a way that does not seem unnatural (Pager 2007) and does not raise any suspicions. Since blind tenants would be unlikely to reveal their blindness directly in written applications, I decided to use a different strategy: I solve the disclosure problem by mentioning in the application messages the presence of a guide dog in the household of the disabled applicant. This device works for two reasons: (1) the guide dog is one of the internationally recognized symbols of blind persons, and (2) dogs are often seen as family members or friends by their owners, 11 so it should seem natural to mention their presence in written applications. Second, household tenants in 10 Consider a similar experiment where three groups of tenants are compared. If the experimenter used the random assignment procedure and randomly selected three housing units that by chance were managed by the same advertiser, this advertiser would receive three fictitious applications (that is, one fictitious application per vacant housing unit). If instead the experimenter used the matched technique, that same advertiser would receive one fictitious application per type of applicant per vacant housing unit (that is, nine fictitious applications in total). In the latter case the risk of exposure is much larger and the advertiser's inconvenience is greater.
11 For Italy, this is confirmed by Eurispes (2013) , and for the United States by the American Veterinary Medical Association (Shepherd 2012). lieu of individual tenants apply to vacant housing units. 12 Although technologies exist that allow blind persons to use computers, some people might be ignorant of their existence; the risk of being detected could increase if some landlords viewed applications with the suspicion that they were supposedly written directly by blind persons. Therefore, the normal-sighted husband wrote each application, wherein he revealed the composition of the household, that is, whether the wife owned a dog and whether this dog was a guide dog.
Each application message was randomly assigned two characteristics. First, the applicant's identity: Andrea Rossi, Francesco Russo, and Alessandro Ferrari; for each of them, one email account was created. Names and surnames were selected based on their frequency in the Italian population and were randomly matched. Second, the household status: married tenants (group A), married tenants with blind tenant plus guide dog (group B), and married tenants with pet dog (group C). Based on what I call an equality assumption, groups B and C differ only with regard to the disability of the wife; in fact, according to this assumption, from the point of view of the advertisers, there is no difference between pet dogs and guide dogs in terms of burden on the apartment, and advertisers have no preference for one over the other.
The equality assumption is based on three sources of anecdotal evidence. First, discussions I have had with members of associations for blind people suggest it is credible. Second, as is the case for pet dogs, guide dogs' behavior within housing units depends on the education they have received from their owners, and not from the education they have specifically received to become guide dogs. Third, newspapers report frequent law violations on the free access of guide dogs to public places and means of transportation; 13 violators often justify their behaviors explaining that guide dogs are no different than pet dogs. 14 This assumption allows for the decomposition of disability discrimination into two parts: one that is directly based on disability status (in this case, being blind), that is, direct discrimination, and one that is more subtle and is based on a specific condition related to the disability (in this case, owning a guide dog), that is, indirect discrimination. The second type of disability discrimination occurs when an apparently neutral requirement that is assumed to apply to everyone (in this study, a pet restriction) has an unfair effect on disabled people. Causes for rejecting applications from disabled tenants with assistance dogs, such as the worry that the dog will damage the furniture or will bark and disturb the neighbors, represent indirect discrimination as they create an unfair effect on the tenants who need their assistance dog to conduct daily activities, such as walking to the grocery store or to the workplace. These two concepts of illegal disability discrimination are two sides of the same coin. 15 Based on the details just discussed, the standard application for a vacant housing unit can be translated as follows: 16 Good morning/evening, My family is interested in the apartment for rent described in the advertisement you posted on the website Subito.it. I would like to move in with my wife [and her (guide/well-behaved) 
If the apartment is still available, we would like to visit it.
Note the specification "well-behaved": it serves to reduce any perceived difference as 14 In the United States, violators of the Americans with Disabilities Act who do not allow guide dogs on the business premises frequently report similar justifications.
15 These two types of discrimination are defined and described in greater detail by Italian law 67/2006 and the E.U. Council Directive Proposal, COM (2008) 426 final. 16 The length of this message is similar to that in other studies that use a CT to investigate discrimination in the housing market Ahmed, Andersson, and Hammarstedt 2008, 2010; Hanson and Hawley 2011; Baldini and Federici 2011). much as possible, in terms of burden on the apartment, between the two types of dog.
Finally, I also randomly assigned a third characteristic that is not directly visible in the application messages: the location of the housing unit. Although CTs are usually focused on housing units in large cities, I randomly assigned the region of the apartment and decided whether the apartment had to be in a metropolitan city or not. The intent of this randomization is to preserve geographic representativeness. Less than 30% of residents live in Italian cities larger than 100,000 inhabitants; 17 thus, focusing only on these larger cities might provide nonrepresentative results.
When the experiment started, each invitation to view an apartment was promptly declined to minimize any inconvenience to the advertiser. Any answer received 31 days after the application message was not registered and was coded as missing. 18 Further details on both the randomization process and application submission are discussed in Appendix A. 19
IV. RESULTS
Invitation to Visit
The outcome of interest is how frequently applicants from different groups receive an invitation to visit apartments to which they have applied. Group A is composed of married tenants, group B is the treatment group and consists of married tenants where the wife is blind and is assisted by a guide dog, and group C is composed of married tenants with a pet dog. The invitation rate for each group is reported in Table 1 , 20 which provides interesting insights. There is a gap of 12 percentage points in the invitation rate between groups A and B, which can be interpreted as a measure of aggregate disability discrimination. "Aggre- (1), (2), and (3) report, respectively, number of observations, mean, and standard deviation of groups' invitation rates.
gate" because this discrimination could be due to the two characteristics that differ between groups A and B: the wife's disability and her guide dog. There is an equivalent gap in the invitation rate between groups A and C that differ based only on the presence of a pet dog; this discriminatory behavior against pet dog owners is legal in Italy. Finally, the same invitation rate is found in groups B and C; given the equality assumption, these two groups differ based only on the blindness of the wife, thus this result seems to rule out the presence of discrimination based on disability status. Therefore, the gap of 12 percentage points in the invitation rate between groups A and B could be caused by the presence of the guide dog alone.
The invitation rate is reported also by advertiser type in Appendix Table B1 . 21 This table shows that the discrimination could be driven by the behavior of apartment owners who invite blind tenants with a guide dog 55.5% of the time, versus 76.4% of the time for tenants with no dog. On the other hand, housing brokers do not seem to invite these two groups at different rates.
The differences in the invitation rates for the three groups of household tenants are then tested with independent group t-tests; the results are reported in Table 2 . This table shows that the gaps in the invitation rate between groups A and B and between groups A and C are statistically significant, while there is no statistically significant gap in the invitation rate between groups B and C.
Equivalent results are obtained when the rejection rate is considered. The rejection rate is the frequency at which applicants receive direct negative answers from advertisers. 22 Appendix Table B2 23 shows that blind tenants face higher rejection rates than normalsighted tenants with no dog (5.7% versus 2.1%, respectively). Table B3 in the same appendix suggests that, while housing brokers' rejection rates for these two groups do not differ greatly (2.2% versus 1.4%, respectively), this result could be driven by apartment owners' discrimination (8.4% versus 2.6%, respectively). 24
Apartment and Advertisement Characteristics
I have collected extensive information from each advertisement. I have taken note of the city name, monthly rent, apartment size, and presence of furniture; I have documented the presence in the advertisements of any photos of the housing unit and of the landlord's telephone number; and I have recorded the date when each advertisement was posted, the date when each application was sent, and the date when each response was received. Additionally, information on the population density of the town where the housing unit is located was retrieved from the 2012 census conducted by ISTAT. From the same census, information on county size and blind population ratio at the county level was retrieved. Table 3 reports the main descriptive statistics for these variables, for the entire sample, and by advertiser type. Both apartment owners and housing brokers answer quickly to apartment queries, on average (one day), sometimes even on the same day (zero days). The quick responses as well as high response rates of this experiment are likely due to the specific times of the day in which I sent the Note: Out of the initial 1,000 observations, one is excluded because the answer was received after 31 days. For each variable, the number of observations in the entire sample might be lower than 999 because of missing values; furthermore, the number of observations by advertiser type may be lower than 999 because of 16 missing values on advertiser type. Size and rent per month are in their original format; other continuous variables are rescaled, as discussed in the following section, but without being demeaned. applications-early morning and late afternoon, which are arguably the most common points of the day to check one's email account-so my messages were likely often at the top of the receivers' mailboxes.
As expected, a qualitative analysis of the answers suggests that it is not possible to keep an exact record of either apartment owners' or individual housing brokers' identities. In around 100 cases, names and emails of apartment owners differ from those displayed in the advertisements. Furthermore, about half of the contacted housing brokers posted advertisements under the name of their real estate agency and answered applications without signing the email. Therefore, the usage of the matched application technique would have increased the chances of being detected compared to the randomized assignment procedure I use.
Finally, pairwise correlations between these variables are reported in Table 4 . These statistics suggest that the randomization process worked as intended, since no relevant correlation between the randomized variables and both apartment and advertisement characteristics is displayed.
Regression Analysis
To insure that the randomization process worked as intended, in this section I investigate the data with a linear probability model (for a motivation, see Wooldridge 2012) , where the dependent variable, Invitation i , is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant has received an invitation to visit the housing unit, and equals 0 if the applicant has not received an invitation or has received a negative answer. The outcome variable is regressed on two variables of interest: the dummy Blind i , where i is a household with a blind wife who owns a guide dog, and Dog i , where i is a household with a pet dog. 25 A vector of control variables, X, includes apartment and advertisement characteristics: apartment square meters and monthly rent, a dummy for the apartment being in a metropolitan city, a 25 Household tenants without a pet dog and where the wife is not disabled (group A) is the reference group. dummy for the apartment being furnished, and dummies that indicate the presence of apartment photos as well as a phone number in the advertisement. Apartment square meters and monthly rent are centered; furthermore, monthly rent is rescaled by being divided by 10. The model also comprises a vector of additional characteristics, F, which include dummies for applicants' identity, apartment region, and application period, 26 as well as a stochastic individual term, . The linear prob-ε i ability model looks like the following:
This model is first estimated only with the independent variables of interest, then the vector of control variables is added, and finally the vector of additional characteristics is included. To better visualize the results, because apartment owners' and housing brokers' discriminatory behaviors are expected to differ, the model is estimated on the two separate subsamples of advertisers. The main estimates are reported in Table 5 . These estimates show no evidence of disability discrimination by housing brokers; in fact, is close to zero and is not statistically sig-β 1 nificant. However, households where the wife is not blind and owns a pet dog experience discriminatory treatment; is highly statis-β 2 tically significant and negative. The difference between and is statistically significant.β β 1 2
The model augmented with control variables and additional characteristics gives equivalent estimates. The combination of these results suggests that housing brokers treat household tenants where the wife is blind and owns a 26 The baseline applicants' identity is Alessandro Ferrari, while the baseline Italian region is Lombardy. The dummy for the application period indicates whether the application was sent after a new national condominium regulation came into force (law no. 220, December 11, 2012, which came into force on June 18, 2013); according to this law, new condominium regulations can no longer include pet restrictions. A natural experiment within this field experiment-to analyze the effect of this law on disability discrimination-is not possible. This law applies neither to other types of apartments nor to condominiums that enforced pet restrictions before this new law; moreover, advertisements did not present information on the housing unit being in a condominium or not, and only 43 observations in total for groups B and C were sent after June 18, 2013. Note: Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. The reference region is Lombardy, in columns (1.C) and (2.C). Robust standard errors corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
guide dog similarly to the reference group (that is, household tenants with no dog). In contrast, Table 4 shows evidence of disability discrimination by apartment owners. Given that is negative and highly statistically sig-β 1 nificant, blind tenants experience discrimination; their invitation rate to visit an apartment is 21 to 24 percentage points lower than that of household tenants with no dog. Moreover, household tenants with a pet dog have an invitation rate that is 19 to 23 percentage points lower than that of the reference group; iŝ β 2 highly statistically significant. The difference between the estimates for and is neverβ β 1 2 statistically significant. On one hand, the combination of these results suggests that apartment owners discriminate against household tenants where the wife is blind and owns a guide dog because of the guide dog alone; according to the legislation referenced above, this type of illegal treatment is to be called indirect discrimination against disabled tenants. On the other hand, this analysis seems to rule out that either apartment owners or housing brokers discriminate against disabled tenants solely because of their disability status; this type of behavior is to be called direct discrimination against disabled tenants, according to the same legislation.
Although this experiment is not primarily designed to investigate the causes of indirect disability discrimination, Appendix C 27 investigates two of them: landlords may discriminate against blind tenants assisted by guide dogs out of concern for the dogs' well-being due to the possible lack of dog-friendly amenities close to the housing unit, and landlords may discriminate against blind tenants assisted by guide dogs out of concern that dogs could damage the furniture. Note that according to the legislation, both scenarios would represent illegal discrimination against blind tenants assisted by guide dogs. Appendix Tables C1, C2, and C3 suggest that both of them could be ruled out. More details on these analyses are discussed in Appendix C.
Experiment Limitations
This experiment presents three possible limitations. First, even though the presence of a guide dog seems to be a clear and natural disclosure device for disability, one may argue otherwise. 28 On one hand, less-experienced advertisers, such as apartment owners, might fail to understand the cue. However, it is worth noting that some answers I received from apartment owners openly acknowledge the condition of the blind tenants. 29 On the other hand, the signal could be too strong: besides the guide dog being considered as a friend, why should blind tenants disclose its presence? The reason is that blind people may wish to screen landlords, to find out who intends to discriminate against them based on dog ownership prior to the visit. If blind tenants disclose the presence of the guide dog only upon visiting the accommodation, they might eventually receive a rejection and end up wasting time and energy. Moreover, although not illegal, failure to disclose the presence of the guide dog prior to signing the rental contract could cause future friction with neighbors and the landlord. For similar reasons, normal-sighted tenants might also desire to screen landlords.
Second, the size of the population of blind people assisted by guide dogs could be small in Italy. As there are no official statistics on the size of this population, it could be reasonable to assume that it is comparable to that of other Western countries: for the United Kingdom, estimates suggest the presence of 4,500 guide dog owners (Chur-Hansen et al. 2014) ; and for the United States, estimates suggest the presence of about 9,000 guide dog owners (Eames, Eames, and Diament 2001) . If the size of this population were equivalently small in Italy, one could argue that the additional time spent by Italian guide dog owners in sending a few more applications to find an apartment would entail a low social cost. However, from the standpoint of society's fairness and equity, this argument is not a valid reason for neglecting the study of this population of disabled people. Moreover, because of the disentanglement I conduct in this study, the results from this experiment could be of interest also to two wider populations: households with a blind tenant without a 29 Some of them mention that the apartment is not on the ground floor or that there are a few steps in front of the building door, and ask whether this is a problem for the wife. In other answers, they explicitly talk about the wife's blindness.
guide dog 30 and households with a disabled tenant who owns an assistance dog (for instance, deaf people assisted by signal dogs; mobility-impaired people helped by fetching dogs; people with psychiatric disabilities assisted by therapy dogs; people with health problems such as diabetes and epilepsy assisted by alert dogs). 31 The results concern blind tenants with no guide dog, if the equality assumption reflects reality, because the household where the wife is blind and owns a guide dog differs from the household with normalsighted wife who owns a pet dog only based on the disability. Furthermore, results on discrimination based on the presence of a guide dog might be of interest to other disabled tenants assisted by different assistance dogs if the equality assumption were stretched further: landlords do not differentiate between pet dogs and any type of assistance dog.
Third, the equality assumption is based only on anecdotal evidence; what if, from the landlords' point of view, pet and guide dogs differ? It would not be possible to establish whether blind tenants assisted by guide dogs were discriminated against because of their disability status, because of the presence of the assistance dog, or a combination of the two. Regrettably, I cannot directly test this assumption; however, I can investigate whether the results are characterized by discrimination based on disability status-which is addressed in the next section. There are two main types of discrimination based on disability status: taste based (Becker 1957 ) and statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973; Aigner and Cain 1977) . Advertisers could prefer to avoid contact with blind people, even if this implied that they would forgo business op-30 According to the 2012 ISTAT census, at the time of the experiment there were 129,000 blind people in Italy (see http://www.salute.gov.it). In my dataset, the sum of the number of blind people per county is about 3,500 units smaller. The reason is that my randomization process is meant to preserve geographic representativeness at the regional and metropolitan level, not at the county level as well. Therefore, five counties (and thus blind people living there) out of 110 Italian counties ended up being excluded from the experiment: Gorizia (in Friuli-Venezia-Giulia), Benevento (in Campania), Ogliastra (in Sardinia), Medio Campidano (in Sardinia), and Belluno (in Veneto). 31 There is no official estimate on the size of these populations either. Note: The variable rent is centered and divided by 10. Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. Robust standard errors corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses.
portunities; in this case, discrimination based on disability status would be taste based. Advertisers could discriminate against households with a blind tenant because they are perceived as being less financially stable on average, for example; in this case, discrimination based on the disability status per se would be statistical.
Robustness Checks
If the equality assumption were unrealistic, groups B and C could have the same invitation rates because of the concomitant presence of differential treatment based on tenants' disability and different preferences for guide and pet dogs in opposite directions. Unfortunately, I cannot directly test this assumption; however, I can investigate whether the results are influenced by the presence of discrimination due to disability status, which could be either statistical or taste based.
In the presence of statistical discrimination based on ability to pay, one could expect the invitation rate of households with a blind wife who owns a guide dog to vary with different levels of monthly rent. This variable is already present in model 1, but in this additional analysis it is also interacted with both Blind i and Dog i . Table 6 shows that the estimates of the interaction effects are about zero and never statistically significant: the discrimination level does not vary with rent, so this statistical discrimination could be ruled out.
This result appears to be reasonable in light of the experimental design, which approaches disability discrimination from the perspective of a traditional family in a country were women's employment rates and average wages are lower than men's. Therefore, whether the wife is disabled does not make a difference in terms of ability to pay rent, from the landlords' point of view. The interpretation of this result should be taken with a grain of salt. There could be statistical discrimination with respect to other applicant or apartment characteristics that are not included in the regression.
In the presence of taste-based discrimination, one could expect the invitation rate of households with a blind wife and a guide dog to vary with the intensity of contacts between blind and normal-sighted people, based on the intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) . Most studies suggest the existence of a negative relationship: the larger the Note: The variable County blind population is given by the ratio County blind population/(County population/1,000). Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. Robust standard errors corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses.
quantity of contacts, the lower the prejudices (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) . 32 The dataset includes a proxy for the intensity of contacts: the quantity of blind people per 1,000 inhabitants of the county where the apartment is located. For this analysis, this variable is demeaned and then added alone as well as interacted with Blind i . Additionally, this model includes a control for county size, which is also demeaned and rescaled by being divided by 100. Table 7 shows that the estimates of the interaction effects are close to zero and never statistically significant: disability discrimination does not vary with this proxy for intensity of contacts, and alternative model specifications provide the same result; 33 there-32 Alternatively, since blind people are not randomly distributed across counties, one could think of the number of blind people in a county as being a proxy for the attitudes toward them in that county. Under this light, this analysis would be following the methodology first suggested by Carlsson and Rooth (2011) , who investigate the presence of taste-based discrimination in hiring by exploiting geographic variation in ethnic attitudes. 33 In a first alternative specification, in lieu of (county blind population/[county population/1,000]), I insert county blind population alone and interacted with Blind i , and control also for (county population/1,000) and (county size/ 100); the result is equivalent. In a second alternative specification, I introduce the ratio (county blind population/ [county size/100]) alone as well as interacted with Blind i fore, taste-based discrimination could be ruled out. However, these results should be considered carefully. The proxy for intensity of contacts reflects the quantity of possible contacts, similarly to other studies on the effect of intergroup contact on discrimination (see for a recent analysis; see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006 for a literature review), while other aspects of intergroup contact are neglected (Carrell, Hoekstra, and West 2015; Finseraas and Kotsadam 2015; Pettigrew 1998) .
These two analyses on statistical and tastebased discrimination should be considered carefully for one additional reason. The interacted characteristics might not be randomly assigned and could be correlated, which would complicate the causal interpretation of the results; Table 4 with the pairwise correlations between variables seems to rule out this possibility.
Additional robustness checks are conducted using different definitions of the outcome variable and different models. First, I reconduct the main analysis using the rejection rate as an outcome variable. The model specification for this and control for (county population/1,000); also in this case, the result is equivalent.
analysis is similar to model 1, but the outcome variable is now a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant has received a direct negative answer. The results are reported in Appendix  Table D1 34 and are equivalent to those in Table  5 . Housing brokers do not discriminate: they reject applications from blind tenants with a guide dog as frequently as they reject applications from normal-sighted tenants with no dog. Conversely, apartment owners discriminate: they reject applications from blind tenants with a guide dog and from normal-sighted tenants with a pet dog in a similar percentage, which is higher than that of the reference group (5.8 and 4.3 percentage points higher, respectively). Second, I reconduct the main analysis with different definitions of the invitation rate 35 and with nonlinear specifications (that is, a probit model). These analyses give equivalent results to those in Table 5 ; for brevity, they are not reported but can be provided upon request.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This study contributes to the literature of the economics of discrimination in three main ways. First, it investigates disability discrimination in the housing market by adapting a standard field experiment-the correspondence test. The focus of this research is on blind tenants assisted by guide dogs in the Italian rental housing market, and, although they are legally protected from discrimination, I find sound evidence that they experience discrimination. Second, this paper contributes by disentangling this discrimination into two parts: one that is directly based on disability status (in this case, being blind) and 34 Appendix D is in the online supplement available at http://le.uwpress.org. 35 In a first alternative definition of the outcome variable, Invitation i , is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant has received an invitation to visit the housing unit, and equals 0 if the applicant has not received an invitation. Therefore, the observations on applications that received negative answers are dropped from the analysis. In a second alternative definition of the outcome variable, Invitation i , is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant has received an invitation to visit the housing unit, and equals 0 if the applicant has received a negative answer. Therefore, the observations on applications that did not receive an answer are dropped from the analysis.
one that is more subtle and is based on a specific condition related to the disability (in this case, owning a guide dog). The findings suggest that blind tenants assisted by guide dogs face discrimination because of the guide dog alone; robustness checks appear to confirm this interpretation. Based on definitions provided by E.U. and Italian laws, evidence of discrimination due to the presence of the guide dog can be referred to as indirect discrimination against disabled people. Indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently neutral requirement that is assumed to apply to everyone (in this study, a pet restriction) has an unfair effect on disabled people. However, the results seem to rule out direct discrimination (that is, taste-based and statistical discrimination), which is due directly to tenants' disability (in this study, blindness). It is certainly interesting to investigate the causes of disability discrimination based on the ownership of an assistance dog, but this experiment is not primarily designed for pursuing that goal. While heterogeneity analyses in Appendix C 36 seem to rule out that this discrimination was due to concerns either for the dog's well-being or for possible damages to the furniture caused by the dog, other plausible reasons remain unexplored. For instance, landlords might worry that the presence of a dog in the housing unit could jeopardize their relationships with neighbors, or, in case they own other housing units in the vicinity, the dog's presence could affect their chances to rent them out, and thus they reject dog owners. As a third contribution to the literature, I show that it is important to account for the type of advertiser when scholars investigate discrimination in the rental housing market. I find that discrimination against blind tenants is driven by apartment owners, whereas housing brokers do not discriminate. These two types of advertisers have quite different characteristics, thus policy interventions would be tailored accordingly.
Awareness and information campaigns could decrease discrimination against households with blind tenants assisted by guide dogs. Awareness campaigns could focus on the role of guide dogs and convey the message that they do not only provide emotional support to their handlers, as all other dogs do, but also assist them in multiple activities throughout the day. For instance, guide dogs identify, and help to avoid, obstacles that their owners cannot identify alone; guide dogs help their handlers to board public transportation and to proceed safely along roads as well as cross them. Awareness campaigns could potentially positively influence those advertisers who know the law but choose to ignore it: perhaps they are not fully aware of the importance of guide dogs for their owners. In addition, information campaigns should be conducted to educate advertisers about the laws; some of them might in fact not be fully aware of what is considered discrimination. Since there is no evidence of discrimination from housing brokers, these campaigns should be tailored to apartment owners and thus be diffused through standard media, while campaigns tailored to housing brokers (for example, additional brokers' education through professional courses) would be ineffective to reduce discrimination.
Note the importance of disentangling different types of discrimination to design appropriate policies. These policies would be ineffective if discrimination were caused solely by disability status, or partially ineffective if it were caused by a combination of disability status and the presence of the guide dog.
Based on different advertisers' behaviors that I have detected by differentiating between them, discrimination could be reduced in a possible third way. Households with a blind tenant and guide dog could be advised to turn to housing agencies for their research of a housing unit, and the fee they pay could be (partially) reimbursed or covered by public institutions.
Since this is one of the first studies on disability discrimination in the housing market, several dimensions still must be inspected. In particular, future studies could proceed to investigate three aspects: First, in order to provide a complete picture of the situation of disabled tenants in the rental housing market, future studies could target tenants affected by other disabilities, such as mental and mobility disabilities. Second, other disabled tenants might face discrimination because of some characteristics indirectly related to their disability; mental and mobility disabilities could be analyzed in this respect. Third, future studies should explore whether disability interacts with other causes of discrimination and hence worsens the conditions of tenants who are already at a disadvantage in the rental housing market.
